Permanent fix for the z-order whack-a-mole (controls/menus/panels hiding
behind the native video). Instead of drawing native video ON TOP of the
WebView, draw it BEHIND a transparent WebView so ALL web UI floats on top
naturally — no suppressing, no clamping, no docked-only bar.
Plugin:
- setHolePunch(on): webView.isOpaque=false + black layer bg + clear scroll
bg (restored on off / call end). Tiles inserted belowSubview:scrollView.
- Dropped native name/mute overlays (the web tile's own .nm/.meet-mute/avatar
render on top now) and the PaddingLabel.
- Zoom re-plumbed: touches hit the WebView, so native gesture zoom can't work;
new setTileZoom({uid,scale,tx,ty}) applies a web-forwarded transform to the
tile's inner video. TileVideoView simplified to a container + applyZoom.
Web:
- bzNativeStartTiles/StopTiles toggle NC.setHolePunch + a body.bz-hp class
(only when the plugin supports it — old builds keep the suppress fallback).
- Tiles with live native video get .bz-hasvid → CSS makes them transparent +
hides the web avatar so the video shows through; name/mute/border stay.
- New web-forwarded pinch/pan/double-tap on the shared screen → setTileZoom.
- Suppress-on-overlay + the height clamp now only apply when NOT hole-punched.
Needs a Codemagic build (plugin). Web deployed; no-ops to the prior behavior
on builds without setHolePunch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Remote Access Platform — Alpha
A self-hostable remote support platform for IT teams: technicians log in to a web
console, see their team's machines, and start a screen-share + remote-control
session to any online machine after the end user grants consent. Built to the
spec in PRD-remote-access-platform.md.
This alpha implements the PRD's P0 requirements: authenticated console, MFA, RBAC, machine enrollment, per-session consent, WebRTC screen streaming + remote input, and an immutable audit log.
remote-access-app/
├── server/ Backend: HTTP API + WebSocket signaling + SQLite
│ ├── server.js Auth, MFA, machines, audit API + signaling broker
│ ├── auth.js scrypt passwords, TOTP MFA, tokens (no external auth deps)
│ ├── db.js Schema via Node's built-in node:sqlite
│ ├── public/ Web console (index.html) + remote viewer (viewer.html)
│ └── test/e2e.js 26-check end-to-end test of the whole backend flow
└── agent/ Native host agent (Electron)
├── main.js Consent window, screen source, OS input injection
├── input/inject.js Mouse/keyboard injection via nut-js (Win32 SendInput)
└── renderer/ Agent UI + WebRTC screen capture
Quick start
1. Server (any OS, Node 22.5+)
cd server
npm install # only dependency is `ws`
npm start # serves http://localhost:8090
Open http://localhost:8090, click Register team, then set up MFA
(add the shown secret to Google Authenticator / Authy / 1Password and enter a code).
Log in, and enroll a machine — you'll get an AGENT_ENROLL_TOKEN.
2. Agent (on the Windows/macOS PC to be controlled)
cd agent
npm install # installs Electron + nut-js (input injection)
set SERVER_URL=http://<server-ip>:8090 # Windows
set AGENT_ENROLL_TOKEN=<token from console>
npm start
The agent window comes online; the machine shows green in the console. Click Connect in the console — the agent shows a consent prompt. On Allow, the technician sees the live screen and can control it. A red banner stays on the host screen for the whole session, and every step is written to the audit log.
Set a machine to unattended at enrollment to skip the consent prompt (for servers / headless machines), per the PRD's unattended-access policy.
What's tested (in this sandbox)
cd server && npm test # 26/26 checks pass
cd agent && npm run test:input # 5/5 input-mapping checks pass
The e2e test drives the real backend: register → enable MFA → login (password + TOTP) → enroll machine → agent connects → technician requests session → consent → SDP/ICE relay → session end → audit verification → consent-denial path.
What requires real hardware (not testable in a headless sandbox)
- OS input injection runs through
nut-js(Win32SendInputon Windows,CGEventon macOS). Without it installed,inject.jsdegrades to a safe logging no-op so the agent still runs. Verify on a real desktop. - Screen capture uses Electron's
desktopCapturer/getDisplayMedia.
Architecture notes
- Media is peer-to-peer. The server only brokers signaling (SDP/ICE) and consent; screen frames and input never pass through it. Channels are DTLS-encrypted by WebRTC.
- NAT traversal uses a public STUN server. ~10–15% of connections behind symmetric NATs will need a TURN relay (coturn) — the next infra item.
- Auth uses scrypt password hashing and RFC-6238 TOTP, implemented on Node's
built-in
crypto— nobcrypt/jsonwebtoken/speakeasydependencies. - Storage is
node:sqlite(built into Node 22.5+), so the backend has a single runtime dependency (ws).
Gaps before production (from PRD §5)
- TURN relay for non-P2P connections (coturn).
- macOS/Linux agents + code-signed installers; packaged Windows binary.
- File transfer, clipboard sync, multi-monitor (PRD P1).
- SSO, session recording, SOC 2 (PRD P1/T8).
- Harden signaling: rate limiting, per-session authz checks, CSRF on cookie API.