Sravan 92f1f8f1a3 Capacitor 8 — Step B: migrate iOS from CocoaPods to Swift Package Manager
Move off CocoaPods (sunsetting; trunk goes read-only Dec 2026) to SPM, the Cap 8
default. This also ends the LiveKit git-pin hack — LiveKit becomes a real SPM dep.

- Each local plugin gets a Package.swift (swift-tools 5.9, iOS 15, capacitor-swift-pm
  from 8.0.0, source path ios/Sources/<Plugin>). native-call additionally declares
  LiveKit: .package(client-sdk-swift, exact 2.15.3) + product "LiveKit".
- native-call Swift: import LiveKitClient -> import LiveKit (SPM product name).
- codemagic.yaml: `cap add ios --packagemanager SPM`; removed the "Install CocoaPods"
  (pod install) step; XCODE_WORKSPACE -> XCODE_PROJECT (App.xcodeproj); build-ipa
  --workspace -> --project. Xcode resolves the Swift packages during archive.
- ios-patch.sh: removed the Podfile LiveKit git-pin injection + Podfile.lock deletion
  (no Podfile under SPM). Info.plist/entitlements/AppDelegate/notif.wav patches stay.
- add-share-extension.rb is SPM-safe (operates on App.xcodeproj, no workspace/Pods refs).

Authored blind (no local Xcode) — expect build iterations on the first SPM build
(cap-add SPM layout, CapApp-SPM plugin wiring, LiveKit SPM resolution, signing).
Fully revertible: git revert -> back to Cap 8 + CocoaPods (working).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 11:48:45 +05:30
2026-06-05 17:29:09 +05:30
2026-06-05 17:29:09 +05:30
2026-06-05 17:29:09 +05:30
2026-06-05 17:29:09 +05:30
2026-06-05 17:29:09 +05:30
2026-06-05 17:29:09 +05:30

Remote Access Platform — Alpha

A self-hostable remote support platform for IT teams: technicians log in to a web console, see their team's machines, and start a screen-share + remote-control session to any online machine after the end user grants consent. Built to the spec in PRD-remote-access-platform.md.

This alpha implements the PRD's P0 requirements: authenticated console, MFA, RBAC, machine enrollment, per-session consent, WebRTC screen streaming + remote input, and an immutable audit log.

remote-access-app/
├── server/        Backend: HTTP API + WebSocket signaling + SQLite
│   ├── server.js  Auth, MFA, machines, audit API + signaling broker
│   ├── auth.js    scrypt passwords, TOTP MFA, tokens (no external auth deps)
│   ├── db.js      Schema via Node's built-in node:sqlite
│   ├── public/    Web console (index.html) + remote viewer (viewer.html)
│   └── test/e2e.js  26-check end-to-end test of the whole backend flow
└── agent/         Native host agent (Electron)
    ├── main.js          Consent window, screen source, OS input injection
    ├── input/inject.js  Mouse/keyboard injection via nut-js (Win32 SendInput)
    └── renderer/        Agent UI + WebRTC screen capture

Quick start

1. Server (any OS, Node 22.5+)

cd server
npm install        # only dependency is `ws`
npm start          # serves http://localhost:8090

Open http://localhost:8090, click Register team, then set up MFA (add the shown secret to Google Authenticator / Authy / 1Password and enter a code). Log in, and enroll a machine — you'll get an AGENT_ENROLL_TOKEN.

2. Agent (on the Windows/macOS PC to be controlled)

cd agent
npm install                     # installs Electron + nut-js (input injection)
set SERVER_URL=http://<server-ip>:8090     # Windows
set AGENT_ENROLL_TOKEN=<token from console>
npm start

The agent window comes online; the machine shows green in the console. Click Connect in the console — the agent shows a consent prompt. On Allow, the technician sees the live screen and can control it. A red banner stays on the host screen for the whole session, and every step is written to the audit log.

Set a machine to unattended at enrollment to skip the consent prompt (for servers / headless machines), per the PRD's unattended-access policy.

What's tested (in this sandbox)

cd server && npm test            # 26/26 checks pass
cd agent  && npm run test:input  # 5/5 input-mapping checks pass

The e2e test drives the real backend: register → enable MFA → login (password + TOTP) → enroll machine → agent connects → technician requests session → consent → SDP/ICE relay → session end → audit verification → consent-denial path.

What requires real hardware (not testable in a headless sandbox)

  • OS input injection runs through nut-js (Win32 SendInput on Windows, CGEvent on macOS). Without it installed, inject.js degrades to a safe logging no-op so the agent still runs. Verify on a real desktop.
  • Screen capture uses Electron's desktopCapturer / getDisplayMedia.

Architecture notes

  • Media is peer-to-peer. The server only brokers signaling (SDP/ICE) and consent; screen frames and input never pass through it. Channels are DTLS-encrypted by WebRTC.
  • NAT traversal uses a public STUN server. ~1015% of connections behind symmetric NATs will need a TURN relay (coturn) — the next infra item.
  • Auth uses scrypt password hashing and RFC-6238 TOTP, implemented on Node's built-in crypto — no bcrypt/jsonwebtoken/speakeasy dependencies.
  • Storage is node:sqlite (built into Node 22.5+), so the backend has a single runtime dependency (ws).

Gaps before production (from PRD §5)

  1. TURN relay for non-P2P connections (coturn).
  2. macOS/Linux agents + code-signed installers; packaged Windows binary.
  3. File transfer, clipboard sync, multi-monitor (PRD P1).
  4. SSO, session recording, SOC 2 (PRD P1/T8).
  5. Harden signaling: rate limiting, per-session authz checks, CSRF on cookie API.
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